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To what extent are visual mental images images? This 
question has been debated, sometimes with considerable 
heat, for centuries (for a review, see Kosslyn, Thompson, 
& Ganis, 2006). One property of an image in perception 
is that it can be examined more or less carefully, and addi-
tional information can be derived over time. For example, 
if shown the uppercase letter A, people can readily verify 
that a horizontal line is present. Moreover, they also can 
verify that there is an enclosed shape and that it is a tri-
angle. They may not have noticed the triangle until asked 
about it but can easily “look more carefully” at the shape 
and classify that part appropriately. If objects in visual 
mental images are like objects we perceive in this regard, 
people should be able to identify properties in mental im-
ages that initially were not noticed.
If mental images allow people to identify properties of 
objects that were not immediately noticed, such images 
presumably preserve information that can be organized 
in multiple ways. The notion that mental images preserve 
material that is relatively “raw,” that can be organized in 
numerous ways, has proven controversial (e.g., Peterson, 
Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992; Reisberg, 1997; Reis-
berg & Chambers, 1991; Rouw, Kosslyn, & Hamel, 1997). 
One way to address this issue is to compare the ease of ac-
cessing two types of properties in perception and imagery: 
those that are likely, “at first glance,” to be represented 
explicitly in memory and those that, like the triangle in 
the A, are likely to be only implicit and to be accessible 
only after more careful scrutiny. That is, we conjecture 
that some visual features are encoded in memory explic-
itly by default, whereas others are represented only im-
plicitly and must be inferred or derived from the explicitly 
encoded information.
The use of the term implicit here should not be confused 
with its use by memory researchers; in our usage, both ex-
plicit and implicit properties are accessible to conscious 
awareness. However, an explicit visual property is noticed 
immediately, stored in memory as such, and subsequently 
can be accessed simply by looking it up in memory; in con-
trast, an implicit property must be derived by reorganizing 
what has been encoded explicitly. Even in perception, an 
internal representation is created as soon as a shape is reg-
istered, and this representation makes only some informa-
tion explicit and immediately accessible (cf. Marr, 1982).
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Can people “see” previously unnoticed properties in objects that they visualize, or are they locked into the 
organization of the pattern that was encoded during perception? To answer this question, we first asked a group 
to describe letters of the alphabet and found that some properties (such as the presence of a diagonal line) are 
often mentioned, whereas others (such as symmetry) are rarely if ever mentioned. Then we showed not only that 
other participants could correctly detect both kinds of properties in visualized letters, but also that the relative 
differences in the ease of detecting these two types of properties are highly similar in perception (when the let-
ters are actually visible) and imagery (when the letters are merely visualized). These findings provide support 
for the view that images can be reinterpreted in ways much like what occurs during perception and speak to the 
wider issue of the long-standing debate about the format of mental images.
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the uppercase letters of the alphabet, printed in a standard 
font, and to write descriptions of their appearance. We as-
sumed that because explicit visual properties would be 
immediately evident, most participants would write them 
down. Moreover, we assumed that if a property was men-
tioned by fewer than 5% of the participants, it could be 
considered implicit.
Method
Participants
Sixteen participants (8 of them male and 8 female; mean age, 
24 years) volunteered to take part in the experiment; all but 1 were 
right-handed, and none reported deficits in visual or auditory per-
ception. None of the participants were aware of the purposes or pre-
dictions of the study prior to testing. The participants were paid $10, 
and all gave their informed consent to take part in the experiment. 
The participants in this, and all the other experiments reported in 
this article, were tested in accordance with all applicable rules and 
regulations governing the treatment of human research participants. 
The study was approved by the Committee on the Use of Human 
Subjects, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University.
Materials
We prepared two lists of the 26 uppercase versions of the letters 
of the alphabet, printed in 14-point Arial font. Four blank lines were 
provided next to each letter, to allow the participants to write their 
descriptions.
Procedure
We asked the participants to imagine that they were teaching an 
elementary English class to a group of adult students who used a 
different alphabet, such as Chinese or Arabic. In order to teach these 
students the letters of the alphabet, our participants were to describe 
each of the 26 uppercase letters of the Roman alphabet. Specifically, 
we asked the participants to write the description of the appearance 
of each letter, to help such students recognize them. We asked the 
participants not to compare the letters to visual objects or scenes, 
such as hat or mountain valley, but, instead, to describe the visual 
properties of the letters.
The participants wrote their descriptions of each letter next to a 
printed version of that letter in the prepared sheets; they were told 
that if they needed additional space, they should feel free to use the 
reverse side of the sheet. We addressed possible effects of practice 
and fatigue by asking half of the participants to describe the letters 
of the alphabet in forward order (A–Z) and the other half to describe 
them in reverse order (Z–A).
The participants also filled out a small set of short questionnaires 
that assessed characteristics that might influence their imagery of 
the letters. They responded to the following, in the order listed: (1) a 
question asking why they had included the visual properties that they 
mentioned in their letter descriptions, in which possible responses 
were (a) “I couldn’t think of any other,” (b) “they most easily came to 
mind,” or (c) “they seemed most relevant”; (2) the “vision” section of a 
Personal Health History form; and (3) a debriefing form asking about 
(a) the participants’ general idea of the study, (b) their understanding 
and following of the instructions, (c) their assessment of how difficult 
the task was, and (d) the strategies they used to complete the task of 
writing the descriptions. The participants were given as much time as 
they wanted to complete the task and typically required between 30 
and 45 min to write their descriptions of the letters.
Results
Coding
In the experiments reported in this article, we examined 
a total of eight different properties. The properties were 
as follows, with the corresponding probe (used in later 
In the experiments reported here, we compared the 
ease of classifying explicit versus implicit properties in 
perception and in imagery. If the same representations 
and processes are at work in both cases, we would expect 
very similar results in the two conditions. Specifically, 
although it may be more difficult (as reflected by longer 
response times [RTs] and increased numbers of errors) to 
classify implicit properties than explicit ones, this differ-
ence should be the same in perception and imagery. We 
expect differences not only in the ease of accessing spe-
cific visual properties, but also in the ease of doing so for 
different patterns; more visually complex patterns should 
be more difficult to inspect. But again, if the same rep-
resentations and processes are at work, we would expect 
comparable differences in imagery and perception.
The issue of whether mental images can be reexamined 
in order to extract properties that were previously unno-
ticed bears directly on the so-called imagery debate (e.g., 
Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Koss-
lyn et al., 2006; Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981, 2003). This debate 
focuses on the format of mental images. The format refers 
to the type of code, which is distinct from the content; 
the same content (e.g., the information conveyed in this 
sentence) can be represented in many formats (e.g., in dif-
ferent languages, written, spoken, in Morse code, as sets 
of bits in a computer memory, etc.). The imagery debate 
is not about whether people store visual information, or 
even whether they can recall visual information and use it 
to perform tasks. These are questions of content. Rather, 
the imagery debate focuses on the format of the represen-
tation, how the information is stored.
Two major theories of the format of mental images have 
been developed in detail. On the one hand, those who es-
pouse the propositional (also known as the descriptive or 
symbolic) account of mental imagery (e.g., Anderson & 
Bower, 1973; Pylyshyn, 2003) argue that mental images 
are represented symbolically, in a   language-like system. In 
fact, such theorists typically argue that the same symbolic 
system is used for all internal representation, including in 
perception and language. On the other hand, those who 
espouse the depictivist account (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 2006) 
argue that points in a representational space correspond 
to points on objects in the world. In this view, every part 
of the representation corresponds to part of the object, so 
that the distances among the represented parts mirror the 
actual distances among the parts themselves. According 
to this view, a mental image is in fact an image; it is not a 
description. If so, much “raw material” should be present 
when one visualizes a pattern, and it should be possible 
to “look again” at an image, extracting shapes or spatial 
relations from it—even if those shapes or relations had not 
been considered explicitly in the past. The present experi-
ments put this idea to the test.
ExPERIMEnt 1
We began by asking whether there are grounds for 
drawing a distinction between explicit and implicit visual 
properties of letters. To assess the presence of explicit 
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evant. In short, the descriptions of 69% of the participants 
apparently reflected the ease with which they could notice 
the visual properties of the letters. This finding is con-
sistent with our assumption that the descriptions indicate 
which visual properties are explicitly represented when 
people see the letters. Perhaps equally important, the fact 
that many sorts of descriptions were rarely, if ever, men-
tioned supports our assumption that these properties were 
not included in explicit representations of the shapes.
Discussion
We clearly could distinguish between two classes of 
properties. One class (which included properties such as di-
agonal lines) was explicitly mentioned by at least half of the 
participants. We conjecture that these properties not only 
are explicitly mentioned in the descriptions the participants 
provided, but also are explicitly encoded in the internal rep-
resentations of the shapes. In contrast, another class (which 
included properties such as symmetrical form) was virtually 
never mentioned. We conjecture that these properties are 
not explicitly included in the internal representation.
We should note that the distinction between explicit and 
implicit properties, as we have defined them here, is dif-
ferent from various other distinctions. For example, it is 
not the case that implicit properties are simply easier to 
verbalize than explicit ones, as witnessed by the ease with 
which we could name members of both categories. Nor is 
it the case that implicit properties are more complex than 
explicit ones or vice versa. Similarly, implicit properties 
need not be smaller or less visible than explicit ones (e.g., 
symmetry, an implicit property, characterizes the shape as a 
whole). Moreover, implicit properties need not be local and 
explicit properties global. However, global properties in 
general may tend to be stored explicitly because they are, by 
definition, relatively large and, thus, are likely to be easily 
noticed. However, as the symmetry example shows, simply 
being relatively large does not ensure that a property will 
be stored explicitly. Local properties, in contrast, may often 
be noticed later and may tend to be stored implicitly. But 
again, simply being relatively small is not enough to ensure 
that a property will be stored implicitly; even local features 
may be stored explicitly if they are distinctive enough (e.g., 
the tail on a “Q”). Indeed, Kimchi (1992) reviewed the lit-
experiments) following each: (1) all the lines in the letter 
were straight, with no curves (the probe for this was “all 
straight”); (2) there was at least one curved line in the letter 
(“curved line”); (3) there was at least one diagonal line in 
the letter (“diagonal line”); (4) the letter contained a fully 
enclosed space, such as the triangle embedded in the letter 
“A” (“enclosed space”); (5) the letter contained a semi-
circle or an incomplete circle (“semi-circle”); (6) at least 
one side of the letter was a horizontal or vertical straight 
line (“straight side”); (7) the letter was symmetrical, ei-
ther horizontally or vertically (“symmetrical form”); and 
(8) the letter contained two endpoints that do not intersect 
with any other lines (“two terminators”).
To be scored as explicit in the letter descriptions, the 
property either had to be mentioned literally or had to be 
indicated by a synonym. The synonym could be a multi-
word phrase that described the property or a special case 
of the property; for example, a “loop” is a certain type of 
curved line. For each of the noted properties, we coded 
the property as explicit if the participants included the 
following descriptions: for “curved line,” a “loop,” “cir-
cular line,” “oval,” “arc,” or other synonym signifying a 
curved line; for “all straight,” straight lines being men-
tioned or implied by noting the horizontal, vertical, or di-
agonal orientation of a line; for “diagonal line,” “slanted 
line,” “line going at a 45-degree angle,” “straight line 
going at an angle,” “a line going from top right to bottom 
left,” or other synonym; for “semi-circle,” “half-circle,” 
“incomplete circle,” “circle with a segment missing,” or 
other synonym; for “enclosed space,” “enclosed area,” 
“closed,” “surrounded,” “enclave,” or another synonym; 
for “straight side,” noting that at least one side of the char-
acter was composed of a straight line, such as by indicating 
that “there is a vertical line on the left side”; for “symme-
try,” “symmetrical shape,” “mirror image,” or a statement 
such as “the same on the left and the right” or another 
synonym; for “two terminators,” “endpoints,” “ending,” 
“terminating,” or “finishing,” as well as “two,” had to be 
mentioned for an explicit coding to be assigned.
For each letter that contained a specific visual feature, 
we computed the percentage of participants who men-
tioned that property. When a property was mentioned cor-
rectly more than 50% of the time, we considered it to be 
explicit; when a property was present but was mentioned 
less than 5% of the time, we considered it to be implicit.
Two coders rated the descriptions to determine whether 
or not a property had been mentioned in a certain descrip-
tion. Reliability of the codings between the two raters 
ranged from 79% to 100%, depending on the property 
(see Table 1). The mean reliability was 92%. In cases of 
disagreement, the coders discussed the disparity, and a 
consensus was reached. Table 1 shows the percentage of 
the cases (over the 16 participants) in which each property 
was mentioned appropriately.
In addition, 63% of the participants indicated that they 
included in their descriptions the visual properties that 
came most easily to mind, 6% indicated that they could 
not think of any other, and the remaining 31% indicated 
that they included the properties they considered most rel-
table 1 
Percent Mention of Properties, Classification, and Reliability  
of Classifications in Experiment 1
% of Correct Explicit or Intercoder
Property Name   Mentions   Implicit   Reliability (%)
All straight 61 explicit 92
Curved line* 95 explicit 92
Diagonal line* 76 explicit 88
Enclosed space* 2 implicit 100
Semi-circle 60 explicit 85
Straight side 16 undetermined 79
Symmetry* 0 implicit 99
Two terminators ,1 implicit 99
Note—Properties mentioned in 50% or more of the cases were consid-
ered to be explicit, whereas those mentioned in 5% or fewer of the cases 
were considered to be implicit.  *Property was used in Experiment 2.Explicit a n d implicit pro p E rt i E s in Vi s u a l  mE n ta l im a g E r y         1027
ception condition of the experiment were presented in a medium-
dark shade of gray, in an attempt to equate partially for the clarity 
of mental images. For the imagery condition, we also prepared a 
300-msec audiofile of the spoken name of each letter.
We selected the explicit visual properties according to the criteria 
that they were (1) mentioned more than 50% of the time by the par-
ticipants who wrote the descriptions in Experiment 1 and (2) were 
present in 20%–80% of the letters. These criteria led us to choose 
as explicit properties “curved line” (correctly mentioned 95% of the 
time, present in 42% of the letters) and “diagonal line” (correctly 
mentioned 76% of the time, present in 38% of letters). We selected 
the implicit properties on the basis of the criteria that they were 
(1) mentioned less than 5% of the time by the participants in Experi-
ment 1 and (2) were present in 20%–80% of the letters. We selected 
“enclosed space” (correctly mentioned 2% of the time, present in 
27% of the letters) and “symmetrical form” (mentioned 0% of the 
time, present in 73% of the letters). Four audio files were created, 
one for each probe, each of which was approximately 200 msec in 
duration; these files contained abbreviated words that designated 
each of the four auditory probes: “curve” for “curved line,” “close” 
for “enclosed space,” “diag” for “diagonal line,” and “sym” for 
“symmetrical form.” We reasoned that if we had used the full names 
of the properties, the participants might have begun processing be-
fore the probes were completed; if so, shorter auditory probe dura-
tions should result in more accurate measurements of RTs.
A trial consisted of a combination of a letter and a probe that 
prompted the participants to judge whether the letter had a certain 
property. Each participant was prompted with the same series of 56 
letter/property pairs (e.g., “U . . . enclosed space”—for which the 
correct response would be no, given that the interior space of the let-
ter is not surrounded by lines on all sides) in the same order. All the 
letters and properties occurred once before any one occurred a sec-
ond time, all occurred twice before any occurred three times, and so 
forth. Furthermore, we designed the series of trials so that (1) each 
of the 26 letters appeared either two or three times; (2) each property 
was probed exactly 14 times; (3) for each property, there were seven 
trials on which that property was present and seven trials on which 
the property was absent; and (4) no more than three consecutive tri-
als could have the same correct response.
We prepared two sets of trials. In the perception condition, a letter 
was presented at the center of the screen. After 1,500 msec, one of 
the four auditory probes was presented. The letter remained on the 
screen until the participant responded either by pressing the “b” key 
on the keyboard (for yes) or the “n” key on the keyboard (for no). 
One second after they responded, they saw the next letter.
The imagery trials had the same format, except that the name of 
the letter was presented auditorily and the letter itself was not shown. 
Specifically, the computer presented a spoken letter and then pre-
sented one of the four probes (again auditorily) 1,500 msec after the 
end of the name of the letter. The 1,500-msec delay allowed enough 
time for the participants to form an image of the character in the 
imagery condition and to have it ready when the judgment probe was 
presented; hence, the RT should reflect more accurately the time to 
make the judgment, and not the time required to generate the image.
Finally, we prepared a block of practice trials for each condition. 
These trials had the identical format as the test trials but used digits 
as stimuli.
Procedure
Learning phase. The participants began by memorizing the ap-
pearance of the 26 uppercase letters of the Roman alphabet and the 
numerals 1–9 in 130-point Arial font on a Macintosh G4 with a 17-in. 
color monitor, 1,024  768 pixel resolution. (Numerals, which were 
not described in Experiment 1, were included in the practice trials, 
but not in the test trials, and thus did not contribute to the results 
presented below.) The participants sat approximately 60 cm from the 
screen. The characters were presented in pseudorandom order until 
all of them had been presented once, at which point the characters 
were repeated in the same order. Each character appeared for 3 sec 
erature on the global precedence effect and found that many 
factors, including relative size, overall visual angle, and at-
tention allocation, can affect whether the global properties 
of an object are, in fact, processed first.
The findings from Experiment 1 provide the bases of 
the following experiment, which attempts to show that the 
representations used when one is perceiving a shape are 
structurally the same as those used when visualizing it.
ExPERIMEnt 2
In perception, an observer can take a “closer look” 
and glean information not noticed previously. We asked 
whether the same is true in visual mental imagery and 
considered two predictions that stem from the two major 
theories of image format. First, consider a prediction from 
the theory that visual mental images are stored in a de-
pictive format, much like that used in the early phases of 
perception (see Kosslyn et al., 2006). According to this 
theory, it should be comparably easy (on the basis of RTs 
and error rates [ERs]) to inspect shapes in mental images 
for implicit properties as it is to inspect shapes during per-
ception for those properties (in both cases, relative to the 
ease of inspecting shapes for explicit properties). Such a 
result would be consistent with the view that visual men-
tal images are like perceptual images in that they can be 
reorganized and inspected with greater care. Second, con-
sider a prediction from the theory that visual mental im-
ages are stored in a descriptive format, much like that used 
in language. According to this theory, it should be more 
difficult to inspect shapes in mental images for implicit 
properties than it is to inspect shapes during perception 
for those properties (relative to explicit properties). This 
finding would suggest that image representations include 
only explicit properties and that implicit properties need 
to be computed and inferred, which is not necessary in 
perception (where the input provides all the information 
needed to extract either type of property).
Method
Participants
We tested 56 participants (28 of them male, 28 female), almost all 
of whom were college students (mean age, 21 years). None of these 
participants had taken part in Experiment 1. Equal numbers of male 
and female participants were assigned to the two groups (imagery 
and perception). We tested and included an additional male partici-
pant after excluding one of the original male participants because of 
an excessive (79%) error rate on one of the probes, which suggested 
that he did not understand the meaning of that probe. All the par-
ticipants reported having normal hearing and normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. All the participants provided informed consent, 
were compensated at a rate of $10/h, and were not informed of the 
purpose or goals of the experiment before they participated.
Materials
The characters on which participants based their responses were 
in 130-point Arial font on the computer screen. However, the nu-
merals 1, 2, and 7 (used in practice trials) were corrected because 
their diagonals were slightly curved; we straightened these curves 
to eliminate possible confusion regarding whether these characters 
contained a diagonal. The letters presented in the study phase were 
saturated black, whereas the letters used in the test phase in the per-1028        th o m p s o n, Ko s s ly n, ho f f m a n, a n d V a n  d E r Ko o i j
knowledge of the property definitions. The participants explained 
to the investigator why each shape did or did not have the relevant 
property. The investigator again reminded them of the definitions of 
each of the four properties.
Practice trials and test trials. Half of the participants next took 
part in the perception condition, and half took part in the imagery 
condition. Because the same questions and stimuli were used in 
both the perception and the imagery conditions, once a participant 
had been exposed to one condition, the correct answers could be re-
hearsed verbally. Thus, the imagery and perception conditions were 
performed between participants. Both conditions began with a set 
of 16 practice trials, and the stimuli were presented using PsyScope 
software running in Macintosh OS 9. In the perception condition, we 
asked the participants to fixate their gaze on the center of the screen, 
view each letter presented to them, listen to the probe, and respond 
by pressing the appropriate key. The participants were to respond yes 
if the probed property was in fact present in the character and no if it 
was not. When they responded correctly, they saw the next letter. If 
they responded incorrectly, they heard a short beep, and the screen 
did not advance until they provided the correct response.
In the imagery condition, we asked the participants to close their 
eyes, listen to the name of the character, visualize it (as it appeared 
when they studied it), and listen to the probe before responding yes 
or no. Otherwise, the two conditions were identical. In both condi-
tions, the participants were asked to respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible.
The participants practiced the task using the digit stimuli. The 
participants received each probe four times, twice when the answer 
was yes and twice when it was no. The different number–question–
answer combinations were presented in pseudorandom order. The 
practice phase required about 10 min, and after the practice phase, 
the participants were given a brief break.
Before beginning the test phase, the investigator reminded the 
participants that their responses and RTs would be recorded and, 
so, they should respond as quickly and accurately as possible. In 
addition, the investigator again reviewed how to perform the task. 
The test trials were identical to the practice trials, only in this case, 
the participants were queried about letters instead of numbers for 
both the explicit and the implicit visual properties. In addition, the 
computer did not beep when the participants made an error during 
and was accompanied by its spoken name. After a character had been 
presented, the participants were asked to visualize it until they felt 
satisfied that their mental image was accurate. At this point, they 
pressed the space bar and saw the character again on the computer 
screen. They now were to compare their mental image with the actual 
character and to correct their image as appropriate. After a character 
had been presented, a visual mask appeared in order to eliminate any 
afterimage of the character. We included the mask to ensure that the 
participants actually generated the images of each character from 
memory, rather than relying on a residual iconic image. After the par-
ticipants felt that they had fully corrected their visual mental image of 
the character, they pressed the space bar and the next character was 
presented. The learning phase required about 30 min, after which the 
participants were allowed to take a short break.
Defining probes. Before practicing the experimental task, the 
participants reviewed the different probes thoroughly. The mean-
ings of the four probe terms were illustrated in figures in which the 
property was or was not present. Specifically, the meanings of the 
probe terms were defined with sets of abstract figures that appeared 
on the screen. The figures (which were mainly based on characters 
from the Linear B syllabary, or modifications thereof) were roughly 
as complex as the letters and numbers but did not resemble specific 
characters. We asked the participants to explain to the investigator 
why each figure had or did not have a particular property. For each 
property, they saw a set of three or four unfamiliar symbols (see 
Figure 1). After seeing each of the probes and the accompanying 
figures, the participants pressed the space bar to request the correct 
answers. The participants were instructed to review the correct an-
swers with the investigator if anything was unclear.
Next, we asked the participants to listen to the auditory probes for 
each property. Each of these probes was approximately 200 msec 
long and consisted of a syllable or two of the property name, as 
was noted earlier. Once the participants had listened to each probe 
twice, we tested their comprehension by asking them to listen to 16 
auditory probes (4 for each property, in randomized order) and to say 
aloud the full name of the property being prompted. If they made an 
error on the full name of the property, the investigator pointed this 
out, and they were asked to correct their response.
Finally, after they were familiar with the auditory probes, we 
retested the participants with new sample shapes, assessing their 
Figure 1. Examples of the figures that were used to train participants to recognize the four properties: curved line, diagonal 
line, enclosed space, and symmetrical form. the participants were asked to examine the figures and to decide, for each one, 
whether or not it featured a given property. they were asked to explain their judgment to the investigator.
Curved Line Diagonal Line
Please indicate which of the shapes below possess the
property curved line, and, in your own words, explain why.
When you have indicated your answers to the researcher,
please press the space bar to continue.
Please indicate which of the shapes below possess the
property enclosed space, and, in your own words, explain why.
When you have indicated your answers to the researcher,
please press the space bar to continue.
Enclosed Space
When you have indicated your answers to the researcher,
please press the space bar to continue.
Please indicate which of the shapes below possess the
property diagonal line, and, in your own words, explain why.
When you have indicated your answers to the researcher,
please press the space bar to continue.
Please indicate which of the shapes below possess the
property symmetrical form, and, in your own words, explain why.
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by examining the effects of the visual complexity of the 
letters on RTs and ERs in the two conditions. Finally, we 
computed the correlations between the 56 individual items 
in perception and imagery, separately for RTs and for ERs. 
If property discriminability plays the same role in percep-
tion and imagery, the RTs and ERs for the items in the two 
conditions should vary in comparable ways.
All analyses of RTs include only data from trials on 
which the participant provided the correct answer. We also 
excluded trials with an RT less than 150 msec, reasoning 
that such a short RT could not reflect processing time for 
the task and more likely would be due to a reflexive re-
sponse. Because standard deviations were lower than the 
mean RTs for a cell, we adopted the criterion of exclud-
ing RTs that exceeded 2.5 times the mean for each cell. 
This criterion represents a compromise between no trim-
ming at all (where long RT trials may or may not reflect 
task-  relevant processing) and trimming based on standard 
deviations, where more trials likely to reflect actual pro-
cessing are susceptible to being eliminated. Our procedure 
led us to treat 2.2% of the data as outliers.
Effects of Probe type in Perception and Imagery
Response times. A two-way ANOVA provided no evi-
dence that the time to evaluate the probes was different in 
the perception and imagery conditions [F(1,54) 5 1.49, 
p . .2, for the interaction between condition and probe 
type]. The means were as follows: perception, explicit, 
564 msec; perception, implicit, 596 msec; imagery, explicit, 
746 msec; imagery, implicit, 816 msec. These results are 
illustrated in Figure 2 (left). However, we did find that par-
ticipants required more time to judge the implicit proper-
ties than to judge the explicit ones [F(1,54) 5 11.28, p , 
.002; explicit M 5 655 msec, implicit M 5 706 msec]. We 
also found that the participants in the imagery condition 
the actual test trials, and the participants were not required to repeat 
trials on which they had made an error.
The participants in the perception condition were told that they 
should view each letter and listen to the name of that letter and that 
they then would hear the name of one of the property probes and 
should evaluate it. If the property was in fact included in the letter, 
they should respond yes; if not, they should respond no, pressing 
the appropriate key as quickly and accurately as possible. RTs were 
recorded from the completion of the property probe. A new trial 
began 1,000 msec after the response.
The procedure in the imagery condition was identical to that in the 
perception condition, but with two changes. First, the participants 
were asked to keep their eyes closed and to form an image of the let-
ter (as studied previously) when they heard its name. Second, when 
they heard the probe, they were to evaluate the letter in their visual 
mental image and then respond as quickly and accurately as possible 
by pressing the appropriate key.
Results
We performed three sets of analyses on the data, analyz-
ing separately RTs and ERs in each set. First, we used an 
ANOVA to address the primary question we posed—that is, 
the relationship between the perception and imagery condi-
tions for the different property types (explicit vs. implicit). 
If the representations underlying perception and imagery 
make accessible the same type of information, these two 
variables should not interact. In addition, in order to inves-
tigate possible differences between perception and imagery, 
we also examined the relative difficulty of the four probed 
properties and the effects of gender and response type. We 
were concerned that if we did not find an interaction be-
tween the ease of evaluating the two types of properties 
(implicit vs. explicit) in the two conditions (imagery vs. 
perception), this would be a type of null effect. Perhaps the 
data were simply noisy, or our techniques were not suffi-
ciently sensitive. Thus, to demonstrate that we could detect 
other patterns in the data, we followed up our first analysis 
Figure 2. Response times (left) and error rates (right) for property type (explicit/implicit) in each condi-
tion (imagery/perception). Participants’ pattern of performance in the imagery condition was comparable 
to that in the perception condition, for both implicit and explicit properties. Error bars represent standard 
errors of the means.
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[F(1,52) 5 19.55, p , .0001; 5.2% vs. 2.3%]. Although 
we did not observe a difference between genders in their 
overall ERs, there was a three-way interaction between 
property, gender, and response type [F(3,156) 5 2.67, p , 
.05]. Males made relatively more errors on yes trials than 
on no trials for the diagonal line property, whereas females 
made relatively more errors on yes trials than on no trials for 
the enclosed space and symmetrical form properties. There 
were no other significant main effects or interactions.
Crucially, in none of the comparisons did we find an 
interaction with condition; if a variable affected percep-
tion, it also affected imagery—and did so in the same way 
and to the same extent.
Complexity Effects
To plumb in greater depth the correspondence between 
imagery and perception and to investigate further the 
issue of whether our paradigm simply lacked sensitivity, 
we considered the effects of visual complexity in both 
conditions. We began by testing 20 additional participants 
(10 of them male, 10 female; mean age, 21 years). All of 
these participants reported normal hearing and normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. They were not informed of 
the purpose of the study before testing and were paid at a 
rate of $10/h. None of these people had participated in Ex-
periment 1 or the main study in Experiment 2 (the results 
of which were just reported).
We showed these participants the stimuli used in this 
experiment, one at a time, and asked them to study each 
character, “paying careful attention to the specific shape 
of each one.” After the participants had learned the char-
acters, using a version of the memorization procedure that 
was used in the main study, we asked them to rate the 
“complexity of the shape” of each character on a scale 
from 1 to 7: The participants were instructed to press “1” 
on the keyboard if they found the shape of the given char-
acter to be very simple relative to the others, to press “7” 
if they found it to be very complex, and to use intermedi-
ate values to designate intermediate levels of complexity. 
To discourage the participants from rating characters for 
complexity of a different kind (e.g., “Z” might be con-
sidered complex because it is used relatively infrequently 
in English words), we included the following sentence in 
the instructions: “Please remember that you are rating the 
complexity of the shape of each character, not the com-
plexity of the character in relation to any other property.”
The mean complexity ratings for the 26 letters ranged 
from 1.0 (for “I”) to 5.6 (for “G”), with an overall mean 
of 3.28 (median: 3.3). Using a median split, the visually 
simple letters were I, O, L, V , T, U, J, C, X, D, H, and P, and 
the visually complex letters were Y, Z, F, N, E, Q, W, A, S, 
M, B, K, R, and G.
To demonstrate that we had the statistical power to de-
tect effects of interest (if they were present), we tested the 
hypothesis that it is more difficult to identify properties in 
more complex letters. We performed a one-way ANOVA 
on RTs and ERs, with complexity as the independent 
variable.
Response times. Using the rated complexity of the let-
ters, we found a difference between simple and complex 
required more time overall than did the participants in the 
perception condition [F(1,54) 5 15.22, p 5 .0003; imagery 
M 5 781 msec, perception M 5 580 msec].
To investigate whether the RT effects observed here 
may reflect more complex interactions, we performed 
four-way ANOVAs that included the following variables: 
condition, property, gender, and response type. We used 
the same trimming procedure as that previously described, 
which led us to exclude 1.9% of the data. We again found 
no hint of an interaction between property and condition 
(F , 1). In addition, we documented that the participants 
required more time in the imagery condition [F(1,52) 5 
13.65, p 5 .0005] and also found that the participants re-
quired different amounts of time for the different proper-
ties [F(3,156) 5 54.85, p , .0001; with means for curved 
line 5 597 msec, diagonal line 5 716 msec, enclosed 
space 5 603 msec, symmetrical form 5 844 msec]. 
Post hoc contrasts revealed that RTs for all pairs of proper-
ties, except curved line and enclosed space, were different 
(p , .0001 in all cases).
We also found that participants required more time in 
general for no responses than for yes responses [F(1,52) 5 
17.28, p , .0001; M 5 715 vs. 666 msec] and found an 
interaction between response and property [F(3,156) 5 
12.20, p , .0001]. Post hoc contrasts revealed that the 
participants required more time to answer no than to an-
swer yes for symmetrical form (p , .0001), whereas there 
was no such difference for the other three properties. No 
other main effects or interactions were significant (p . 
.05 in all cases).
Error rates. We performed an analogous ANOVA for 
ERs. Again, there was no interaction between condition 
and property type [F(1,54) 5 1.26, p . .2]. The means, 
in percentages of errors, were as follows: perception, ex-
plicit, 2.4%; perception, implicit, 5%; imagery, explicit: 
3.3%; imagery, implicit, 4.2%. These results are illus-
trated in Figure 2 (right). However, the participants made 
more errors on trials probing implicit properties than on 
those probing explicit properties [F(1,54) 5 5.45, p , 
.03; implicit M 5 4.6%, explicit M 5 2.9%]. The partici-
pants in the two conditions made comparable numbers of 
errors (F , 1). (Note that even here, the participants in the 
imagery condition were correct for implicit properties at 
least 95% of the time, which demonstrates that they could, 
in fact, perform the task well.)
We performed a second ANOVA with the same four 
variables used in the second analysis of RTs, now con-
sidering the ERs. We again did not find an interaction be-
tween property and condition (F , 1) but did find that the 
participants made more errors for some of the properties 
than for others [F(3,156) 5 9.4, p , .0001]; the mean 
error rates by property were as follows: curved line 5 
1.8%, diagonal line 5 4.0%, enclosed space 5 2.4%, and 
symmetrical form 5 6.8%. Follow-up tests revealed that 
the participants made more errors on the symmetrical 
form judgment than on each of the other three (p , .01 in 
all cases) and more errors on the diagonal line judgment 
than on the curved line judgment (p , .05).
We also found that the participants made more errors 
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ficiently, and (2) they have clear prototypes, even across 
most font styles, and thus they lend themselves to the 
types of descriptions that we requested from the partici-
pants in Experiment 1. For a reexamination of the details 
of an image to be useful, it is essential that the details be 
recalled vividly and that they be represented accurately 
in the image. Hence, we used stimuli that we could teach 
participants quickly and that, in spite of the short training 
period, were likely to give rise to accurate mental images. 
We expect the same pattern of results—that is, that previ-
ously unnoticed properties can be examined and verified 
in imagery—for any stimulus that can be visualized with 
a high degree of accuracy.
Thus, these findings also bear on previous research in 
which participants have been asked to verify a detail in an 
image of a more complex object. For example, in some 
studies, participants have been asked to verify properties 
of animals, such as the shape of their ears (e.g., Kosslyn, 
1975). Many such properties are relatively subtle, and 
hence it is likely that they are implicit. If so, these previ-
ous findings are consistent with the present results, which 
show that people can inspect objects in images and notice 
properties that are only implicit in the image.
This ability also allows shapes in mental images to be 
combined to form novel patterns (with new sets of prop-
erties that can be verified using imagery). For example, 
Finke (1990) asked participants to memorize drawings of 
complex shapes and then asked them to visualize combi-
nations of the shapes that would create novel objects. The 
participants were then asked to draw the objects that they 
had produced using imagery. Some of these objects were 
very creative, and the participants reported noticing emer-
gent visual properties that they had created using imagery, 
some of which were totally unexpected.
In order to use imagery in such ways, one must be fa-
miliar enough with the stimulus to visualize it in detail. 
But more than that, because images are representations in 
working memory, for reinterpretations to take place (or for 
unnoticed features to be detected), working memory capac-
ity should not be overly stressed, or the details of the image 
will not be maintained long enough to be inspected accu-
rately. Indeed, Mast and Kosslyn (2002) demonstrated that 
reducing the load on working memory allowed participants 
to mentally rotate and reinterpret complex figures.
The fact that previously unnoticed properties are as ac-
cessible (relative to explicit properties) in mental imag-
ery as in perception has broad implications for theories 
of mental imagery and mental representation in general. 
Pylyshyn (1973, 2002), for example, has argued that men-
tal images are represented as symbols akin to descriptions 
or propositions. If mental images were represented in a 
descriptive format, the organization of the representation 
would probably be based on explicit properties of the stim-
ulus. If the visual imagery system relies on such proposi-
tional representations and the visual perceptual system (as 
is widely accepted) relies in part (particularly during the 
relatively early phases of processing) on depictive repre-
sentations, we would expect that implicit properties would 
be less accessible in imagery than in perception. When 
information about implicit properties must be retrieved 
letters [F(1,55) 5 12.07, p 5 .001]. The mean RT for sim-
ple letters was 657 msec, and the mean RT for complex 
letters was 695 msec.
Error rates. We did not find differences in ERs for 
simple letters (3.6%) versus complex letters (3.8%) 
[F(1,52) , 1].
Aside from the finding that more time was required to 
evaluate letters in imagery than in perception (see above), 
no other main effects or interactions were found when let-
ter complexity was included as a variable (p . .1 in all 
cases).
This finding that the participants required more time 
when they evaluated complex letters than when they eval-
uated simple ones—in addition to all of the other effects 
and interactions reported above—suggests that we did not 
lack statistical power to detect findings that were, in fact, 
present. Nevertheless, condition (imagery vs. perception) 
never interacted with any other variable.
Correlational Analysis
Response times. We found a very high correlation co-
efficient when we correlated the mean RT for each item in 
perception with the corresponding mean RT for that item 
in imagery (r 5 .87, p , .0001). This is strong evidence 
that the same factors were responsible for variations in 
RTs for the items in perception and in imagery.
Error rates. We performed the same analysis with the 
ERs and found a correlation coefficient of r 5 .49, p 5 
.0001, between perception and imagery. Again, we have 
evidence that the same factors that affect processing in 
perception also affect processing in imagery.
GEnERAL DISCuSSIon
The present results provide strong support for the claim 
that previously unnoticed properties of objects can be 
reliably detected in visual mental images. Moreover, the 
results provide solid evidence that the same representa-
tions and processes are used in both visual perception and 
visual mental imagery in this task. In both cases, there is 
“something to examine more carefully” when one is asked 
about a property that was not immediately noticed, such 
as whether a shape is symmetrical along its vertical or 
horizontal axis. Nobody would be surprised to learn that 
this is true in perception, where the shape itself remains 
visible, but some researchers have denied that this is pos-
sible in mental imagery. According to these researchers, 
either an image is accompanied by a description, which 
locks in a certain organization (cf. Chambers & Reisberg, 
1992; Reisberg, 1997), or images are nothing more than 
descriptions (Pylyshyn, 1973; for a review, see Kosslyn 
et al., 2006). If either of these possibilities were correct, it 
should be much more difficult to identify implicit proper-
ties, relative to explicit ones, in imagery than in percep-
tion; but this was not the case.
We should note that although we used letters as the 
stimuli in this study, our predictions do not rely specifi-
cally on such stimuli. We selected letters as the test stim-
uli because (1) they are well-known shapes, and thus it is 
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from memory, as in Experiment 2, we would expect im-
plicit properties to require more time to verify (relative to 
explicit properties) in imagery than in perception, because 
a computation would need to derive the properties. This 
prediction was not borne out by the results.
Depictive representations in general have the charac-
teristic of making emergent visual properties explicit, and 
thus any visual property, even if not explicitly noticed and 
stored as a description, can be examined and evaluated in 
perception. Our results suggest that perceptual and imagery 
representations in working memory share the same repre-
sentational format. The evidence from this study supports 
the view that visual mental imagery, like perception, relies 
in part on depictive representations. The imagery system 
makes implicit properties explicit and accessible (as when 
one is examining a picture in front of one’s eyes).
These findings relate to an even more fundamental 
question in psychology, which also has implications in 
philosophy. Pylyshyn (2002) has claimed that in the ab-
sence of convincing evidence for depictive representa-
tions, it makes the most sense (i.e., is most parsimonious) 
to posit a single “language of thought,” which relies on 
symbol systems. We have argued that there is strong evi-
dence for depictive representations in imagery (see Koss-
lyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2003; Kosslyn, Thompson, & 
Ganis, 2002, 2006), and the present results support this 
view, with the wider implication that there is more than 
a single language of thought. If the mind were a toolkit, 
it would have more than a single pair of pliers; it would 
have a host of different tools, with different ones being 
appropriate for different tasks.
We note that, from an evolutionary perspective, once 
the perceptual system is in place, it may be adaptive for 
memory and reasoning processes to take advantage of these 
mechanisms. For example, it may be advantageous to be 
able to reactivate a visual mental image and reexamine it, to 
search for properties that were not previously noticed. De-
pictive representations would be especially useful because 
they allow a large amount of information to be preserved 
in an efficient format. And the fact that images can then be 
recombined to produce novel scenes can play an essential 
role in planning and reasoning more generally.
In short, our results not only provide evidence that vi-
sual mental images share a representational system with 
visual perception, but also support the view that depictive 
representations are used in both imagery and perception. 
This finding is consistent with much neuroimaging work 
(e.g., Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003), which demonstrates 
that the topographically organized cortex—which liter-
ally supports depictive representations—is activated when 
shapes must be inspected with high resolution, as was the 
case in the present experiments.
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